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According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Vermont, an action to recover for false representations made
Action,
Survival,
False
Representations

by the seller of personal property does not survive,
as against his estate, under a statute (Rev. Stat.
Vt. § 2446,) which provides that actions " of tres-

pass and trespass on the case for damages done to

. .. . personal estate shall survive:" Jones v. Ellis's Estate,
35 Atl. Rep. 488.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has lately held, that the
monthly fines provided for by the by-laws of a building and
loan association are not by way of penalty, but are
Building
Associations, rather to be considered as liquidated damages,
Fines
fixed by consent of the parties, for the loss sustained by the association by reason of the failure of the defaulting member to make prompt payment; and since such payments are essential to the success of the plan of the association,
and for the interest of its members as a whole, the fines will be
enforced, independently of statutory provisions, if reasonable in
amount and equitable in their application: Roberts v. American
Bdg. & Loan Assn., 36 S. W. Rep. lO85.
This case also holds that a fine of "ten cents per share, to.
be imposed for each and every month that payment is not
made," is reasonable.
Under a by-law of a building association, which provides
that "borrowing members who shall neglect to pay any
instalments as the same become due, shall pay to
Accumulative
the association a fine of twenty cents per month
Fines,
Construction on each one hundred dollars that they have borof By-Law
rowed from the association," the fine for one
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month is not repeated and added to that of each succeeding
month, making the amount increase in arithmetical progression, but only twenty cents on each one hundred dollars can
be imposed in any one month; and when the constitution of
a building association prescribes the fines to be
Imposition
imposed on delinquent members, it thereby fixes
of Fines,
the limit beyond which the association cannot go;
Waiver
but it may by by-law waive some part of the fines so authorized, and impose smaller ones, and in that case the by-law will
govern: Diupuy v. Eastern Bdg. & Loan Assn., (Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia,) 25 S. E. Rep. 537.

A genuine silver coin of the United States, which is distinguishable as such, though rare, and differing in appearance
from other coins of this government of the same
Carriers,
denomination, but of later date, is nevertheless a
Fare,
Legal Tender, legal tender for car fare, and a passenger ejected
Eection

for refusal to pay fare otherwise than by tendering

such a coin is entitled to recover damages : Atlanta Consolidated St. Ry. Co. v. Keeny, (Supreme Court of Georgia,) 25
S. E. Rep. 629.

In Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Mulford, (Supreme Court of
Illinois,) 44 N. E. Rep. 861, reversing 59 Ill. App. 479, the
defendant company sold to the plaintiffs, ticket
Sale of
Coupon
brokers, a number of tickets over its own road,
Tickets over
Other Lines, with coupons attached for transportation over a
These tickets were issued under
Liability for connecting line.
Default of
Connecting
Line

an agreement with that line, and were honored by
it for a number of years, until it passed into the

hands of a receiver, who was ordered by the federal court to
refuse to accept the rest of said tickets for passage. The
plaintiffs then sued the defendant for damages, and recovered
judgment; but this was reversed by the Supreme Court, on
the ground that in selling those coupons the defendant acted
merely as the agent of the connecting line, and was not liable
for its failure to perform its contract.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has lately ruled, that though
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a railroad company cannot, by special contract with a passenger, exempt itself from liability for the results of its
Liability for
Injury,

Express
Messenger,
Limitation of
Liability by
Contract

negligence as a common carrier, Net, since it is no

part of its duty as a common carrier to carry
the goods of an express company and the messengers in charge thereof, when it does undertake to
cr

carry an express messenger, as a matter of accommodation, or by special engagement, it becomes a private
carrier, or bailee for hire, as to him, and may protect itself by
contract from the results of its negligence so far as he is concerned; and therefore, if an express messenger contracts with
the express company to assume all risk of injury he may sustain in the course of his employment, whether occasioned by
the gross or other negligence of any railroad, or other
carrier, and authorizes the express company to enter into a
contract on his behalf with any such carrier, exempting it
from liability for injuries he may receive in the course of transportation, a contract between the express company and a
carrier in pursuance of the authority so conferred is valid and
binding on him; but the mere fact that he has made such
a contract with the express company will not entitle a carrier by which he is transported to the benefit of that contract,
if it had no knowledge of it [or if it did not proceed to
secure its benefits by contracting with the express company?] : Louiszle, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Kecfcr, 44 N. E.
Rep. 796.
According to another decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, when a carrier, through its negligence, fails to send a
passenger's baggage by the same train as the
Liability,
Act of God
passenger, it is liable for the loss of the baggage,
if destroyed in consequence of such delay, though by an act
of God : JVa/,1 v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 44 N.
E. Rep. 888. r2versing 6o Il. App. 46o.
i his case cec-ares the Johnstown flood, caused by the
breaking of a dam which retained a large volume of water at
a high elevation, caused by extraordinary and unprecedented
rains, thereby letting into a narrow valley a volume of water
twenty to thirty feet in height, to have been an act of God.
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The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately assisted in the
-demonstration of the proposition that law is the perfection of
human reason, by holding that one who carries a
Carrying
pistol from a shop where it had been repaired,'
Concealed
though he does so at the request of the owner,
Weapons
and for the sole purpose of delivering it to him, is guilty of the
offence of carrying a concealed weapon, if he carries it concealed upon his person: Goldsmith v. State, 25 S. E. Rep.
624.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, a limitation in a deed by which property is conveyed in
trust for a certain church parish, that, if the beneCharitable
Gift,
ficiary ceases to exist in union with the diocese,
Limitation
the property shall be held in trust for another
Over,
Validity
parish, is valid; and a provision that in such case
it shall be held "for such uses as will most nearly accomplish
the object desired," is not void for uncertainty: Parish of
Christ Church v. Trustees, 35 Atl. Rep. 552.
Generally speaking, the rule against perpetuities does not
extend to charitable gifts; In re Wall, 42 Ch. D. 510, 1889;
Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483, 1856; New Haven Inst. v. New
Haven, 6o Conn. 32, I89I; Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind.
.449, 1885; Board v. Dinwiddie, 139 Ind. 128, 1894; Dexter
v. Gardner, 7 Allen, (Mass.) 243, 1863; Il re Bartlett, 163
Mass. 509, 1895; Wardens & Vestry of St. Paul's Ch. v.
Atty. Gen., 164 Mass. 188, 1895; Atwater v. Russell, 49
Minn. 57, 1892; State v. Gerard,2 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 210,
1842; Yard's Appeal, 64 Pa. 95, 1870; Webster v. Wiggin,
(R. I.) 31 Atl. Rep. 824, 1895; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex.
173, 1863 ; but if it is conditioned upon a future and uncertain event, it is then subject to the rule: Chamberlayne v.
Brockett, 8 L. R. Ch. 2o6, 1872; Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb.
(N. Y.) 324, 1850; e. g., a bequest to a volunteer corps of
militia, to take effect upon the appointment of the next lieutenant-colonel, is void as a perpetuity, because such an officer
may never be appointed: Alt v. Lord Stratheden, [1894] 3 Ch.
265, 1894.
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Accordingly, a gift to an individual, and then to a charity
upon contingency, is within the rule, and will never vest, if the
contingency is not within the time allowed: Atty. Gen. v. Gill,
2 P. Wms. 369, 1726; Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96, 1858;
Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434, 1859 ; and if a gift to a charity
is limited to an individual upon a contingency not within the
time of the rule, it will be void: Brattle Sq. C. v. Grant, 3
Gray, (Mass.) 142, 1855 ; Wells v. Heath, io Gray, (Mass.) 17,
1857 ; but a contingent limitation over of property from one
charitable use to another is not within the rule: Trustees v.
Grainger, I Macn. & G. 46o, 1849; Jones v. Habersham,
107 U. S. 174, 1882, affirming 3 Woods, (U. S.) 443,
1879; Trustees v. Whitney, 54 Conn. 342, 1887; Lenniq's
Estate, 154 Pa. 209, 1893. Where a gift was made to a
charity, on condition that it keep the testator's tomb in
repair, with remainder over to another charity on breach
of that condition, the remainder was held valid: Tyler v.
Tyler, [1891] 3 Ch. 252, 1891.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has lately held,
in Cline v. State, 36 S. W. Rep. IO99, that the provision of
Constitutional section IO of the bill of rights, (substantially
Law,
identical with the provisions of other state con-Bill of Rights,
Criminal Law

stitutions,) that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him,
refers to the prosecution by " public trial " before the "impartial jury " also guaranteed him by the same section; and
in view of that provision, and the declaration of section 29,.
that "everything in this bill of rights shall forever remain
inviolate and all laws contrary thereto . . . . shall bevoid," neither court nor legislature can legally authorize the
reading in evidence against the accused on his trial of testimony given by witnesses on another hearing, whether at the
trial in court or before an examining magistrate, even upon a
showing that such witnesses are dead.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, has.

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

recently decided, that the act of that state, (Rev. Stat. Mo.
1889, § 3782,) which provides that " every person
Freedom of
who
shall knowingly send or deliver any letter,
Speech,
Threatening writing, printing, circular, or card, with or withLetters,
out a name subscribed thereto or signed with a
Collection
fictitious name, or any letter, mark or device,
Agency
to do any injury to the person,
threatening . . ..
property, credit, or reputation of another, though no money
or property be demanded or extorted thereby, shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor," is not unconstitutional, either as depriving the creditor of property without due process of law, or as limiting the freedom of speech;
and that under that act a person who sends letters to a
debtor, threatening to publish him among his neighbors as a
bad debtor, unless the debt is paid, is liable to the penalty
thereof: State v. McCabe, 37 S. W. Rep. 123.
In Ernest v. Loma Gold Mines, Ltd., [1896] 2 Ch. 572,
Chitty, J., of the Chancery Division, has made an important
ruling on the subject of voting by proxy. The
Corporations,
articles of association of the defendant corporation
Meetings,
provided that at any general meeting "every motion
Voting by
Proxy,

made and submitted shall be decided in the first
instance by a majority in number of the members
to be ascertained by a show of hands ; and unless a poll is
demanded by at least three members holding at least onetenth of the shares of the company, a declaration by the
chairman that a resolution has been carried . . . .shall be
sufficient evidence of the fact . . . ." (6o ;) that "every member shall have one vote for every share which he shall hold
in the company" (62 ;) and that votes may be given either
personally or by proxy" (66.) At an extraordinary general
meeting to consider a resolution to go into liquidation, the
plaintiff, who was himself the owner of 2ooo shares, held
valid proxies from 431 shareholders, representing io2,ooo
shares. When the resolution was put to the meeting, twelve
shareholders voted for it on the show of hands, and the plaintiff
and another against it. The plaintiff claimed to vote for himViva Voce
Vote
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self and all others whose proxies he held, but the chairman
refused to consider this claim, and declared the resolution
carried. The plaintiff then demanded a poll, but this was
refused, on the ground that it was not demanded by a sufficient number of members present in person. The resolution
was subsequently confirmed, and the plaintiff then brought
suit for an injunction to restrain the company from acting upon
it; but this was refused on the ground that the provision of
the articles of the association that votes should be given either
personally or by proxy did not apply to voting by show of
hands; and that a member present only by proxy has no
right to vote upon a show of hands: (following in re Calorie
Engine & Siren Fog Signals Co., 52 L. T. N. S. 846, 1885,
and disapproving In re Bidwell Brothers, [1893] I Ch. 603,
1893.).
This statement seems too broad, though correct as applied
to the state of facts which called it forth. If the person who
-claims to vote is not himself a member, (which is by no
means an impossible case,) he certainly should be allowed to
vote, even on a show of hands; and if he holds two or more
proxies, he should still be allowed one vote.
In the same case the notice convening an extraordinary
general meeting to confirm the above special resolution, was
accompanied by a circular from the secretary
ValidIty
of Proxy
and directors, with a proxy attached, asking for
the return of the proxy in support of the resolution. By an
error of the printer the date of the meeting was left blank in
the proxy. In several of the proxies this blank was filled
by the secretary after they had been executed and returned
by the members. The plaintiff objected to them on this
ground, and, his objections being overruled, alleged this as
a ground for the injunction; but the court held that since
the members must have intended by returning the proxies
in compliance with the circular that they should be used at
this particular meeting, authority to the secretary to fill in
the date would be presumed, and that the proxies were valid.
In order to render a newly-organized corporation liable at
common law for the debts of an established corporation or
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firm to whose business and property it has succeeded, it should be proved: (i) That it has
expressly assumed them by contract with its predecessor; or (2) That the transfer of the property
and franchises of the predecessor
amount to a
fraud upon the creditors of the latter; or (3) That the circumstances attending the creation of the new corporation, and its
succession to the business, franchises and property of the old,.
are such as to warrant the finding that it is a mere continuation of the former,-i. e., the same corporate body under a new
name: Austin v. Tecumseh Natl. Bk., (Supreme Court of
Nebraska,) 68 N. W. Rep. 628.
In Hatcher v. United States Leasing Co., (Circuit Court,
District of Colorado,) 75 Fed. Rep. 368, a mining company,
having exhausted its resources and incurred a
Liability of
Old Corpora- large indebtedness in attempting to develop its
tion for Debts mines, leased the same to a new corporation
of New
formed by the same stockholders under
the laws
of a different state. The new corporation paid off the debts of
the old one, and prosecuted the work for some time, but finally
became insolvent. Under the circumstances, it was held that
as far as third persons were concerned, the reorganization was
a mere change of name, without affecting the ownership of
the property, and that the old company, as well as the new,
was chargeable with a mechanic's lien for labor and materials
furnished to the latter.
Newly-

Organized
Corporation,
Liability
for Debts of
Predecessor

The Supreme Court of Colorado has lately held, that
under the act of that state, (Mills's Am. Stat. Colo. § 104,)
which provides that " every person who ...
Cruelty to
tortures, torments . . . . or needlessly mutilates
Animals,
any animal, or causes or procures
or kills ....
Shooting
Doves or
Pigeons from
Trap

shall, upon conviction be
it to be done, ....
punished," etc., a member of a gun club, shoot-

ing for amusement doves or pigeons from a trap, some of which
are wounded and afterwards killed, while some escape apparently unhurt, is liable, though those killed are used for food
Waters v. People, 46 Pac. Rep. i12.
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This is in accord with the case of State v. Porter, I 12 N.
C. 887, 1893, decided under a similar statute, and opposed to
that of State v. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215, 1877, which,
under a like statute, reached the opposite conclusion. It
would seem, however, that not only the weight of authority.
but of reason as well, supports the view of the majority:
Comm. v. Lewis, 14o Pa. 261, 1891, must be distinguished
from these, for the Pennsylvania statute only punishes those
who " wantonly or cruelly ill-treat . . . . any animal."
According to a recent ruling of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, though the pendency of an action for divorce in one
Divorce,
state will not constitute a legal bar to an action
Pcty
of subsequently commenced in another state between
Different
States,
Ex parte
Decree,
Validity,
Bona Fides

the same parties, yet it is a fact of which the
second court should be fully advised, as it is a
ground upon which it may, in the exercise of its

discretion, and in the spirit of comity, stay its
proceedings, when it can do so without prejudice to the rights
of its citizens; and when the second action is exparte, and
the plaintiff conceals the fact of the pendency of another
action in a different state, in which issue has been joined on
facts essential to the jurisdiction of the second court, that
concealment amounts to a fraud on the court, which will render
its decree in the suit null and void: Dunhamn v. Dunham, 44
N. E. Rep. 841, affirming 57 Ill. App. 475.
In the case under discussion a husband brought an action
for divorce in the state of his residence, which was also the
domicile of the marriage, charging the infidelity of the wife,
and that she had deserted the plaintiff without cause, and
gone with her paramour to another state, for the sole purpose
of acquiring a residence there, and fraudulently procuring a
divorce. Personal service was obtained on the wife, who
appeared, and joined issue upon those allegations by answer.
Subsequently she began an action for divorce in South
Dakota, which was heard ex parte, constructive service being
had on the husband, and the court not being advised of the
pendency of the former suit, and a decree of divorce was
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-obtained therein prior to the determination of the husband's
.action. It was then attempted to plead this decree in bar of
the husband's suit; but the court held that under the facts it
*was no valid bar.
The fall brings its usual crop of election decisions. One
-of the most interesting of these is, that when an election is
Elections,
In Several
Districts,
Failure to
Hold In

one District

required to be held contemporaneously in several

districts, (e. g., for the purpose of determining
whether they will join for the purpose of holding a
union high school,) it will not be invalidated by

the fact that no election is held
in one of these

-districts, if it appears that had an election been held there,
and had all the qualified voters of that district cast their
votes against the proposition a large majority would still be in
favor of it: Sharp v. George, (Supreme Court of Arizona,) 46
Pac. Rep. 212.
The Supreme Court of Montana, has recently held, that a
party convention of a single county, which is one of two or
more counties comprising a judicial district, has
Elections,
Nomination
no authority to place in nomination a candidate
of Candidates,
District
Composed of
Several

Counties

for a state office in that district, since a legal
nomination to such an office can only be made
by a convention

representing all the voters in

the several counties of the district: State v. Rotwitt, 46 Pac.
Rep. 370.
The same point was similarly decided in In re Ingram's
Certificate, 14 Pa. C. C. I, s. C., 3 D. R. 272, 1893, and In
re Craig's Certificate, 14 Pa. C. C. 3, 1893; and as to nominations by conferrees, in In re Butler p. Nomination Papers,
14 Pa. C. C. 470, 1894; In re Savage's Nomination, 15 Pa.
C. C. 229; S. C., 3 D. R. 705, 1894.
In the same case the court ruled that since the statute has
recognized the right of political parties to nominate candidates
for office through conventions or primary meetNomination
by Petition, ings, they have an equal right to refrain from
Rights of
making nominations, and no person not so nomiPolitical
Parties

nated has the right to have his name placed on
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the official ballot as the candidate of a party; and therefore a
candidate placed in nomination by petition is the nominee of
the petitioners only, and cannot be designated on the official
ballot as the candidate of a regularly nominated party: State
v. Rotwitt, (Supreme Court of Montana,) 46 Pac. Rep. 370.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has properly interpreted
the requirement of the state constitution (Art. 7, § I,) that a
voters,

voter must reside in the state for six months im-

mediately preceding an election, to be entitled to
vote, to mean an actual settlement within the state, adopted as
a fixed habitation, and accordingly held that persons coming
from another state to work under contract of employment,
leaving their families behind them, were not residents of Colorado in the sense that qualified them to vote: Sharp v.
Residence

McIntire, 46 Pac. Rep. 115.

Not so many years ago, this precise question was raised at
an election in Montgomery county, Pennsylvania; and the
persons who were interested in having the illegal voter vote
secured from the county judge an ex parte expression of
opinion on the strength of which the election officers, against
their better judgment, received his vote.
According to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, when, in
a viva voce election for trustee of a school district, a voter casts
Viva Voce

his vote for one person, and it is so recorded,

whereupon he leaves the table where his vote is
Voting
taken, and other votes are then cast and recorded, he cannot
thereafter have his vote changed to the other candidate, even
though he had intended to vote for him, and called the name
he did by mistake or inadvertence: Hopkins v. Swift, 37 S. W.
Rep. 155.

Some of the readers of this magazine may remember that
this was the predicament into which Mr. Murtough Murphy
shrewdly entrapped the unhappy Mr. Furlong, who had come
down from Dublin to teach the rustics how to conduct an
election, as is recorded by one Samuel Lover, in a book
entitled "Handy-Andy."
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently held that
the act of that state of 1895, c. SIo, § 83, which amends the
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Special

general election law, and provides for the prepara-

Election,

tion and use of official ballots at all elections for

Ballot Laws,
Mode of
Voting

the submission of questions to the electors of the
state, " or of any district thereof," does not apply

to an election held under an act authorizing the holding of an
election in territory to be designated, to determine whether or
not such territory shall become incorporated into a village;
and that the provisions of the latter act, prescribing the mode
of voting at such elections, are still in force: Zn re Taylor,
44 N. E. Rep. 790, affirming 38 N. Y. Suppi. 348.
In the same case it was also held, that the act (Laws N.
Y. 1895, c. 73,) authorizing the use of voting machines, and
providing that, when adopted by a town, they
Voting
Machines
shall be used at all elections in that town, or
any part thereof, applies only to elections in organized divisions of the town, and not to an election at which the voters
in certain territory within a town vote on the question
whether such territory and a portion of the territory of another town shall be incorporated into a village.
According to the Supreme Court of Colorado the Ballot
law of that state (Acts Colo. 1891, p. 143,) which provides
Ballots,
Marking

that "where a cross is marked in ink against a
device indicating a vote for the entire set of candi-

dates, and also another cross in ink against one or more names
in another list, such ballot shall only be held invalid as to any
office so doubly marked," implies that such ballot shall not
be counted for either candidate for an office so doubly marked:
Heiskell v. Landrum, 46 Pac. Rep. I2o.
When a voter writes in the name of a candidate on the
ballot, the fact that he also writes after the name the party
designation of that candidate does not invalidate
Distinguish.
Ing Mark
the ballot on the ground that it constitutes a distinguishing mark: Jennings v. Brown, (Supreme Court of
California,) 46 Pac. Rep. 77.
Under a statute (Burns's Rev. Stat. Ind. 1894, § 6325)
which provides that "whoever hires or buys ....
Elections,
Criminal
any person to vote or refrain from voting any
Offences
ticket or for any candidate for any office at any
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election held pursuant to law, or at any primary election or
convention of any political party, then the person so offending
in any one of the foregoing particulars, and all other persons
aiding, abetting, counseling, encouraging or advising such
acts, shall become liable," etc., the offence denounced by the
statute is complete when a voter is hired to go away from the
polls and refrain from voting at the time he goes there for that
purpose, though he subsequently returns and casts his vote:
Thompson v. State, (Appellate Court of Indiana,) 44 N. E.
Rep. 763.
The difference between the images produced upon a photographic plate and upon the human eye does not render photographs of the plan where an accident has been
Evidence,
Photographs caused inadmissible in evidence, but bears only
upon the effect of such evidence: Scott v. City of New
Orleans, (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,) 75 Fed.
Rep. 373.
Another instance of misplaced ingenuity!
The lawyer
who raised this point should give his time to the writing of
detective stories.
When a prisoner is committed for trial on a criminal
charge, under state process which is in itself regular and valid,
Extradition, his imprisonment is not rendered illegal by the
Inter-state, fact that he was brought back from another state
Warrants
Procured by as a fugitive from justice, by means of extradition
False
warrants procured by false affidavits; and the fedAffidavits
eral courts will not release him on habeas corpus
on that ground alone: In re Moore, (District Court, D.
Oregon,) 75 Fed. Rep. 821.
This decision is the necessary result of the doctrines that a
fugitive who has been kidnapped and brought back into the
state where his offence was committed is not entitled to release
on habeas corpus: Ex parte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446, 1829: Ex
parte Ker, 18 Fed. Rep. 167, 1883 ; Ker v. Illinois, I 19 U. S.
436, i886, affirming Ker v. People, I io Ill. 627, 1884; Afahon
v.Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 1888, affirming 34 Fed. Rep. 525,
1888; State v. Ross, 21 Iowa, 467, 1866; Dows' Case, 18 Pa.
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37, 1851; State v. Snith, I Bailey, (S. Car.) 283, 1829;
State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 1 18, 1835 ; contra, State v. Simmons,
39 Kans. 262, 1888; In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 189o; and
that when once he is within the jurisdiction he can be tried
for any offence other than the one for which he was surrendered by a sister state: In re Noyes, (U. S.) 17 Alb. L. J.
407, 1878; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 1893, affirming 90 Ga. 347, 1892; Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4, 1893; Williams v. Weber, I Colo. App. 191, 1891 ; People v. Sennett, (Ill.)
20 Alb. L. J. 230, 1879; Hackney v. Welsh, 107 Ind. 253.

1886 ; Waterman v. State, 116 Ind. 51, 1888; Statev. Kealy,

8 9 Iowa, 94, 1893; Comm. v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 1893;
State v.Patterson, i16 Mo. 505, 1893; State v. Walker, I19
Mo. 467, 1894;. ln re Petry, (Neb.) 66 N. W. Rep. 308,
1896; People v. Cross, 135 N. Y. 536, 1892, affirming 64
Hun, 348, 1892; State v.Glover, 112 N. C. 896, 1893; In
re Brophy, 2 Ohio N. P. 230, 1895 ; Comm. v. fohnston, 12 Pa.

C. C. 263, 1892; Bam v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645, 1878 ; Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Ty. 131, 1887; State v. Stewart, 6o
Wis. 587 1884; contra, In re'Hope,4o Alb. L. J. 44 I, 1889;
In re Baruch, 41 Fed. Rep. 472, 1890; In re Fitton, 45 Fed.
Rep. 471, i8gi; State v. Hall, 4o Kans. 338, 1888; In re
Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 1882; though not when surrendered
by a foreign country, even for a less offence included in the
greater: U. S. v. Watts, 14 Fed. Rep. 130, 1882; -Exparte
Hibbs, 26 Fed. Rep. 421, 1886; U. S. v. Rauscher, I19 U.S.
407, 1886; Exparte Coy, 32 Fed. Rep. 911, 1887; Comrn.v.
.Hawes, 13 Bush, (Ky.) 697, 1878; State v. Vanderpoo, 39
Ohio St. 273, 1883; Blandford v. State, io Tex. App. 627,
1881; contra, U. S. v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 131, 1871 ;
U. S. v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. (U.S.) 295, 1876 ; In re Miller,
(U. S.) 6 Crim. L. Mag. 511, 1885 ; In re Reinit, 39 Fed.
Rep. 204, 1889; People v. Harman, 9 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 6oo,
(See
1894; People v. Stout, 8I Hun, (N. Y.) 336, 1894.
28 Am. L. Rev. 568; 32 AM. L. REG. N. S. 557.)
The courts of Nebraska and Ohio have yielded on the
former points-to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and surrendered their former opinions: In re
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Petry, (Neb.) 66 N. W. Rep. 308, 1896, overruling Zn reRobinson, 29 Neb. 135, 189o; In re Brophy, 2 Ohio N. P.
230, 1895, overruling Ex parte McKnight, 48 Ohio St. 588,.
1891 ; but the courts of Kansas apparently cling to their old
views; See State v. Meade, 56 Kans. 69o, 1896.
In accord with the doctrines above enumerated, it has been'
held that a prisoner cannot set up as a ground for discharge
that he has been enticed into the state by fraudulent representations: In re Brown, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 576, 1886; nor
that the extradition proceedings in the other state were irregular: Hall v. Patterson, 45 Fed. Rep. 352, 1891 ; In re Miles,
52 Vt. 609, I88o.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently
held that the authority conferred by statute upon a married
(Code Va.
Husband and woman to devise her separate estate,
so to
power
an
express
to
is
equivalent
§
25
13,)
Wife,
Wife's
devise in the instrument creating the estate, in the
Separate
Estate,
Power to
Devise,
Curtesy

absence of any provisions therein to the contrary;
and therefore, that a conveyance of land by a father
to his daughter's husband "in trust, nevertheless,

for the sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit " of the
daughter, " and free and discharged from debts, contracts,
liabilities and marital control" of the husband, creates a sole
and separate estate in her, which she can dispose of by will,
free from the husband's right of curtesy: .Kiracofe v. Kiracofe,
25 S. E. Rep. 6oi.

A member of a social club may maintain suit to enjoin the
commission by it of an indictable rhisdemeanor, such as the
sale of intoxicating liquors, when the commission
Injunction,
Misdemeanor, of the act, if it is such a misdemeanor, will probably
Intoxicating
damage property rights of his in the club : Klein
Liquors,
Sale by Club v. Livingston Club, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 35 Atl. Rep. 606.
In the same case it was held that the furnishing of liquor
by a club to its members, each paying the cost of what he
consumes, is not a sale within the meaning of an act (Act Pa.
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May 13, 1887, P. L. lO8,) making the sale of liquor without
license illegal. This is in accord with the weight of authority.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Indiana, the
terms of the accident insurance policy on which suit was
brought, required, under penalty of forfeiture, that
Accident
Insurance, notice of accidental injury or death be given within
Notice of
Death,
Sufficiency

ten days, with "full particulars of the accident and
injury." It appeared that the insured was drowned;

that his wife, who was the beneficiary, did not and could not
know until the finding of a coroner's jury, eleven days after
his death, that he died of accident; that she gave the required
notice within five days afterwards ; that the company admitted
that he was accidentally drowned; and that the general agent
of the company had actual knowledge of the facts within the
ten days. Under these facts, it was held that the notice was
sufficient: Peele v. Provident Fund Soc., 44 N. E. Rep. 66I.
A new and very interesting question of insurance law
lately arose in a case tried in the Commercial Court in London, before Collins, J., without a jury: West
Fire
Insurance,
of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1896] 2 Q. B.
Subrogation,
Benefits
377. The facts were substantially as follows: The
Renounced by premises insured were demised by one Bunnell
Insured,
and another to Jones and Hill for a term which
expired in December, 1894, with covenants
to
repair and leave in repair, and also to insure the premises in
the Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation in the joint
mames of the lessor and lessees. About one year after the
demise Jones assigned his interest to Hill, who in 188o
assigned to one Bennett. The following year Bennett secured
a policy for -8oo on the buildings in the Royal Exchange
-corporation in the joint names of himself and the lessors,
which policy was still in existence at the date of the action.
In 1885, Bennett granted to the defendant a lease of a warehouse, part of the premises comprised in the original lease,
for the residue of the term, less ten days; this lease containing covenants on the part of the defendant, the lessee, to
repair and leave in repair, and on the part of Bennett, the
Rights of
Insurer
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lessor, to insure the premises and to lay out the moneys
received under any insurance policy in making good damage by fire, with a proviso that if such moneys proved insufficient the defendant was to remain liable under his covenant to
repair to make good the deficiency. On August 26, 1885, the
defendant obtained a policy in his own name with the plaintiff
company in the sum of £8oo on the warehouse demised to
him by the sublease. In 189o Bennett died, and in the following year an action was brought in the Chancery Division
for the administration of his estate. On July 18, 1893, a fire
occurred by which the warehouse leased to the defendant was
damaged. In 1894 an order was made in the administration
action by which Bennett's lease and the benefit of his policy
in the Royal Exchange corporation were assigned to Jones,
and a deed carrying out the order was duly executed. Notice
to repair, accompanied by a specification or schedule of dilapidations, was given under the original lease by the lessors to
Jones, who in turn gave notice to repair, with a schedule of
dilapidations, to the defendant. Jones died shortly afterwards,
and his executors demanded from the Royal Exchange corporation the payment of £ioo, the amount at which both
insurers and the defendant had agreed to fix the damage. On
March 28, 1894, the plaintiff company, having been sued by
the defendant, paid him the sum of £ioo, the agreed amount
of the loss caused by the fire. It was admitted, that at this
time the plaintiffs knew of the existence of the Royal Exchange policy.
On January 9, 1895, the original lease and the sublease
having both expired, the ground landlords brought an action
against Jones's executors to recover damages for breach of
the covenant to repair, contained in their lease; and on January
19 th a like action was brought by Jones's executors against the
defendant. The first action was settled by a payment of .25o,
and the action brought against the defendant herein was also
settled by his paying to Jones's executors 014o, they giving
him a receipt for all claims under the schedule of dilapidations,
which included damages by fire, and he undertaking at the
same time not to bring any action against them for breach of
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the covenant in the sublease to lay out instuance moneys
received in repairing the damage caused by the fire. Jones's
executors continued to press their claim against the Royal
Exchange corporation, and, on April i9, 1895, the sum of
£ioo was paid to them by that corporation, in discharge of
their claim. The plaintiff then brought this action against the
defendant, to recover the sum of -Ioo, upon the ground that
in making the settlement with Jones's executors the defendant had had the benefit of the Royal Exchange policy or of
the lessor's covenant in the sublease, or alternatively that he
was bound to make good to the plaintiffs the full value of his
rights against his lessor which he had renounced for his own
reasons, and to which, if not renounced, the plaintiff would
have had a right to be subrogated. This latter contention was
sustained by the court, on the ground that, since a policy of
fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, the insurer is entitled to recover from the insured not merely the value of
any benefit received by him by way of compensation from
other sources in excess of his actual loss, but also the full
value of any rights or remedies of the assured against third
parties which have been renounced by him, and to which,
but for that renunciation, the insurer would have a right
to be subrogated.

After previously declaring that it is the duty of the courts
to give full force and effect to the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme
Judgment,
Revival,
Court of Vermont proceeds to escape from the
Scire Faclas,
consequences of that declaration, by holding that
Effect,
when a judgment entered in a foreign state under
Full Faith
and Credit
a power to confess judgment on a
note is revived
there by scire facias without service on or appearance by the
defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover thereon after the limitation has run against the original judgment; for such a revival
is either a new proceeding, substituted for an action of debt,
and therefore invalid if prosecuted without service on the
defendant or appearance by him, or a continuation of the
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original actiorl, and therefore barred by the statute of limitations: Betts v. Johnson, 35 Atl. Rep. 489.
Unhappily, this doctrine has the support of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Owens v. McCloskey, i6I U. S.
642; S. C., 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793, 1896, (see 35 Am. L.
REG. N. S. 325,) and must therefore be regarded as settled.
But it seems to savor of technicality, rather than of justice.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has lately ruled, that when
a landlord, who owned another building adjoining that occupied
Landlord
and Tenant,
Eviction

by a tenant, the two being constructed together,
tore the former down, rendering the latter unsafe
for occupancy, and then procured its condemna-

tion and destruction by the city authorities, these acts constituted an eviction, for which the tenant might recover
damages ; and that the landlord could not avail himself of the
action of the city authorities as a defence: Silber v. Larkin,
68 N. W. Rep. 4o6.
According to a recent decision of the last-mentioned court
the publication in a newspaper of remarks made at a meeting of a city council, by the city's representaLibel,
tive in the state assembly, purporting to give
Privileged
information as to the conduct of the city's reprePublication
sentative in the state senate with reference to the passage of
certain amendments to the city charter, is not privileged,
though the newspaper is the official paper of the city, if the
article is a mere voluntary unofficial report, published simply
as a matter of news; especially when the paper circulated
outside the city and the district represented by the senator:
Awckstaff v. Hicks, 68 N. W. Rep. 403.
The Supreme Court of Vermont upholds as constitutional an act of that state, (Acts Vt. 1894, No. 59,) which
provides that every person desiring to do business
Licenses,
Constitutional in the state as an itinerant vendor shall deposit
$500 with the state treasurer, to be returned at
Law
the end of the year less fines and penalties, after which, on
application, and the payment of a fee of $25, he is entitled to
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a state license for one year; that he may then apply to the
city or town clerk where the goods are kept for sale, and
shall file a sworn statement of the average value of his stock,
and if,
in the judgment of the board of aldermen or selectmen, a local license should be granted him, the clerk may be
authorized to issue it on payment of a sum based on that
value: State v. Harrington,35 Atl. Rep. 515.
The court bases its decision, so far as the vulnerable point
of the act is concerned, on the fact that the act reposes a
judicial discretion in the aldermen or selectmen, thus securing
the applicant against their arbitrary action. But since the
act provides no safeguard against the arbitrary or malicious
exercise of that discretion, and the court confesses its inability
to aid him in case they abuse it, it may well be doubted
whether this protection does protect. It would seem to
any ordinary mind that the Connecticut statute, which was
declared unconstitutional in State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478,
1895, and which provided that the city and town authorities
"'tmay issue" a license, was not so very unlike one which
provides, as the present one, that the clerk "may be authorized" to issue it, even though it is predicated that it should be
proper in theirjudgment to grant that authority; and it would
also seem that the airy way in which, after stating that the
Vermont statute is " nearly an exact transcript of the Massa.chusetts Act of I89o," which was held constitutional in Comm.
v. Crowell, 156 Mass. 215, 1892, the court passes by without
discussion the fact that that statute declares that the clerk "shall
issue" the license, shows a dread of the possible result of
such a discussion. To say the least, the argument by which
the decision is supported is unconvincing.
In U. S. v. Bunnell, (District Court, S. D. Iowa, C. D.,) 75
Fed. Rep. 824, it appeared that a paper issued by a collection
showagency contained on its first page a motto
Malls,
Improper Use, ing that its purpose was to collect debts; that a
Defamatory large part of the paper contained notices warning
the public against persons alleged to
have failed
as
to
such perto pay their debts, or asking for information
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sons ; that, when an account was sent to the agency for collection, the alleged debtor was notified that, if not paid, the
account would be advertised in the paper as being for sale;
and that the paper contained many such advertisements.
Upon these facts it was held, that, since the object appeared
to be to coerce the payment of money, the notices published
were "calculated by the terms . . . . and obviously intended
to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of
another," within the meaning of the act of Congress of September 26, 1888, (I Suppl. Rev. Stat. U. S. 621.)
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Indiana, the negligence of a railway company in blocking a
street crossing with its train for an unreasonable
Negligence,
length of time is not the proximate cause of
Proximate
Cause
injuries received by a pedestrian from a fall
caused by a defect in the street while he was endeavoring to pass around the train: Enocks v. Pittsburgh, C., C.&
St. L. Ry. Co., 44 N. E. Rep. 658.
Sewage discharged into a stream, though sterilized and
rendered colorless and apparently innoxious of itself, maybecome a nuisance, when, by reason of its com-

Sewage,
Chemicai

bination with other substances in the stream, it
becomes noxious and pollutes the waters, though

Combination

the other substances were wrongfully deposited in
the stream by others than the defendant; and in such case its
further discharge into the stream may be enjoined : Morgaw
v. City of Danbury, (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecti-cut,) 35 Atl. Rep. 499Under a statute which expressly provides that in awarding
a contract for public employment the awarding body shall not
be "limited to the lowest bidder, but may take
Public
into consideration the responsibility of such bidder,
Contracts,
and his capacity and ability to perform such conLowest
Bidder
tract, in all cases making such awards as will
promote the best interests of the state, and secure the cheapest.
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and most prompt and efficient performance of said contract,"
that body is invested with a very broad discretion, and though
they must advertise for bids, they may reject any or all of
them, and award the contract to one who has not bid at all, if
the price be reasonable: Peeples v. Byrd, (Supreme Court of
Georgia,) 25 S. E. Rep. 677.

The secretary of a corporation which has a contract for
lighting a city, who is also a stockholder therein, is within the
prohibition of an act, (Act Pa. March 31, I86o,
P. L. 382, § 66,) prohibiting any councilman from
Officers,
being interested in any contract with the city,
Interest in
Contracts

though he was elected councilman after the execution of the contract: Comm. v. DeCamp, (Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania,) 35 Atl. Rep. 6oi.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, following the analogy of
the rule laid down in Roeller v. Ames, 33 Minn. 132, 1885,
that the salary of a municipal officer due him from
Salary,
Attachment, the corporation cannot be reached by proceedings
supplementary to execution, holds that the wages
Execution
of a fireman due him for services as such cannot be thus
reached by his creditors, on the ground that public policy forbids that legal proceedings should intervene to prevent the
payment to the fireman himself of the wages due him for his
services: Sandwich Hfg. Co. v. Krake, 68 N. W. Rep. 6o6.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently decided, that
a requirement that a public officer shall have a seal of office, by
Seal of Office which his acts shall be authenticated, is not complied with by the use of a seal which does not
contain the name of the state, but in which the space for that
name is left blank, and in the impression the name is written in
that space with a pen; and that a verification authenticated by
such a seal is insufficient: Oelbermann v. Ide, 68 N. W. Rep393The rule that holds the public records open to the inspection of any one, which was discussed in the preceding number
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proElectoral

of this magazine, (35 AM. L. REG. N. S. 721, et
seq.,) does not extend to such records as are by
law required to be kept secret; and therefore,

Board
Inspection

though so much of the record of the proceedings
of the electoral board of a county, (in Virginia,)

Public
Records,

required by law to be kept, as relates to matters other than
the preparation of official ballots, is open to the inspection of
any citizen and voter, who may make notes or memoranda
"therefrom at any reasonable time, and within a reasonable
space of time, in the presence of the secretary of the board,
.yet so much of said record as relates to the preparation, printing, or certification of official ballots to be used at elections,
which proceedings are required by law (Laws Va. 1895-6,
pp. 763-770,) to be kept secret, is not open to the inspection
,of any one, except officers charged with duties in connection
therewith. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus will not be
granted to compel the secretary to permit the relators to
inspect and copy from the record of the proceedings of the
electoral board of a county, when it is not shown that the
portions desired to be inspected and copied are such as are
properly open to the public, and that their reasonable request
-therefor has been refused: Gleaves v. Terry, (Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia,) 25 S.E. Rep. 552.
In Ball v. Evans, (Supreme Court of Iowa,) 68 N. W. Rep.
435, the plaintiffs, members of the Iowa Soldiers' Home, at
Marshalltown,
r
Iowa, brought suit for the purpose
Soldiers'
of setting aside certain rules adopted by the
Home,
Rules,
board of managers in reference to the disposition
Pensions
of pensions paLid to the inmates. These rules
-vere as follows:
"Second. Any person admitted to the home having a pension exceeding six dollars per month shall surrender all of
said pension in excess of six per month to the commandant;
-and, if the person so surrendering his pension has dependent
relatives, the money so surrendered shall be paid to such dependent relatives by the commandant; and, in case such pensioner shall have no dependent relatives, the excess of his
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pension over six dollars per month shall be credited by the
commandant to the support fund. Third. If any member of'
the home shall fail or refuse to surrender to the commandant
the portion of his pension as herein required, such refusal or
failure shall be deemed a violation of the rule, and the commandant shall give such offending member an honorable discharge."
"Rule 25. Any person entering the home having a pension
exceeding six dollars per month shall surrender all of said
pension in excess of six dollars per month to the com-mandant; and, if the person so surrendering his pension has
dependent relatives, the money so surrendered shall be paid
to said relatives by the commandant; and, in case such person
shall have no dependent relatives, the excess of his pension
over six dollars per month shall be credited to the contingent
fund. The words 'dependent relatives,' as herein used, shall
mean wife, minor children, and parents."
"Rule 27. All members of the home who shall hereafter
be charged and found guilty of violating the rules of the
home, and who have a pension, shall surrender the entire
amount of their pension to the commandant, who may, in his
discretion, pay the same to the pensioner, or to his dependent
relatives, (under Rule 25,) or turn the same over to the state,
as in his judgment may seem to the best interest of the home."
The court, however, following Loscr v. Board, 92 Mich.
633, 1892, held these rules to be valid, as being within the
act of assembly providing for the establishment of the home,
which conferred upon the managers the power to "determine
the eligibility of applicants for admission to said home," (§ 2,)
and to "adopt a seal and make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws and constitution of this state, for the
management and government of said home, including such
rules as they may deem necessary for the preserving of order,
enforcing discipline, and preserving the health of its inmates;"
and not being in violation of Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 4745, 4747,
which enact that any pledge, mortgage, sale, transfer, or assignment of any right, claim, or interest to a pension shall be
void.
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Specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real
estate will not be enforced against a vendee, when the title
offered by the vendor can be held good only by
Specific
Performance, declaring a statute unconstitutional, and when,
Sufficiency
even if this were done, and the vendee compelled
of Title

to accept the title, he would still be exposed to
suit by interested persons who are not parties, and who therefore would not be bound by the judgment: Danielv. Shiaw,
{Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 44 N. E. Rep.
991.
The expression of the sovereign will of the legislature that
a particular proposition or question be submitted to the people
to be voted upon need not take the form of a law;
State
Legislature, it is sufficient if it be in the form of a joint resoluJoint
tion. Therefore, it is the duty of the secretary of
Resolution,
Duty of

Secretary of

state to certify to the proper officers of the various
counties in the state a joint resolution passed by

the legislature, that the question whether a constitutional convention should be held should be submitted to
the people; and he may be compelled by mandamanus to do
.so, if he refuses: State v. Da, (Supreme Court of North
Dakota,) 68 N. W. Rep. 418.
The amendment of a subdivision of a section of a specified
statute is not unconstitutional, though the amendatory act
does not contain the whole section as amended.
Statutes,
Amendment, It is a sufficient compliance with the requirements
Constitutional of the constitution if the new act contains the subLaw
division as amended: State v. City
of Kearney,
.(Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 68 N. W. Rep. 533.
The Supreme Court of Oregon holds, disregarding the
weight of authority, that a person who alights from a streetcar in broad daylight, and in attempting to cross
Street
the track immediately behind the car, is struck
Railroad,
Injury to
ijrd
-.. 1
by a car on the other track and injured, is guilty
Person
Alighting
of such contributory negligence as will bar a
from Car
recovery for the injury, because, when a pas-
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senger on a street car steps from the car to the street, the
relation of passenger and carrier ceases: Smitlz v. City & Suburban Ry. Co., 46 Pac. Rep. 136.
Of the cases cited by the court, but two are in point:
J.1ecr v. Lindel Ry. Co., 6 Mo. App. 27, 1878, and Buzby v.
Traction Co., 126 Pa. 559, 1889, and it wholly ignores the
numerous cases in which the contrary has been held. These
will be found in the August number of this magazine: 35
A i. L. REG. N. S. 532. The need of supporting its decision
by the ruling that the company owes no duty to the passenger
after he has alighted is therefore apparent. But in any
rational view of the case, the company does owe the passenger a duty while he is on its premises, to wit, the track,
which is not discharged until he has reached the opposite side
in safety. On all grounds, then, the decision is as manifestly
wrong as was that of the Pennsylvania court in Buzby v.
T-action Co.
Under the tax laws of New York, which impose a tax on
the transfer of property "when the transfer is by will ....
of property within the state and the decedent was
Taxation,
Inheritance, a non-resident," (Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 399, § ,)
Stocks and
Bonds of

and define the word " property," as used in the
preceding clause, as embracing all property "over
Corporations
Owned by which the state has any jurisdiction for the purNon-residents poses of taxation,"
(Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 399, §
22,) and also define "personal property" as including "all
written instruments themselves as distinguished from the
rights or interests to which they relate by which .
an), debt or financial obligation is created, acknowledged, evidenced . . . . wholly or in part," (Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 677,
§ 4,) the Court of Appeals has lately ruled that bonds of a
local corporation, kept at the residence of a non-resident owner,
are not subject to the tax: In -e Bronson, 44 N. E. Rep. 707,
affirming 37 N. Y. Suppl. 476; and that federal bonds are
not so subject: In i-e Whiting's Estate, 44 N. E. Rep. 715,
affirming 38 N. Y. Suppl. 131 ; but that stocks of a local corporation kept at the residence of a non-resident owner are
Foreign
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liable to the tax, on the ground that a share of stock represents an interest in the corporate property, which does not
follow the person of the creditor, but remains attached to the
situs: Zn re Bronson, 44 N. E. Rep. 707, reversing 37 N. Y.
Suppl. 476; and that bonds of a foreign corporation, kept
with a safe deposit company in New York at the time of the
death of a non-resident owner, are also liable thereto: In re
Whiting's Estate, 44 N. E. Rep. 715, affirming 38 N. Y.
Suppl. 13 1.

From this latter decision Gray and Haight, JJ., dissented,
in an opinion (by Gray, J.,) which is conclusive. He shows
beyond a doubt that the bonds of a foreign corporation cannot be regarded as having a situs in the state. It is a curious
fact that the majority of the court seem to have wholly ignored the fact that if their ruling in the Bronson case that the
bond follows the person of the creditor is correct, this decision
must be wrong, for the locality of the bond does not effect
that situs. The decision, therefore, seems erroneous; and
since it is of such far-reaching consequence, one cannot but
hope that an opportunity will arise for the Supreme Court of
the United States to pass upon the question and settle it
finally.

An injunction will lie to prevent trespassing on a game
Trespass,
Relef In
Equity

preserve, by which game is killed, and other game
is frightened away and deterred from returning,

since the remedy at law is inadequate: Kellogg v.

King, (Supreme Court of California,) 46 Pac. Rep. 166.
Where all combinations and associations of persons formed
for the purpose of imposing .an unreasonable restraint upon
the exercise of a trade or business are unlawful
Trusts and
and void, as against public policy and the statutes
Monopolies,
of the state, a court of equity will not lend its
Rights of
Members,

Jurisdiction
of Equity

aid to a member of such an unlawful association,
to enable him to retaip his membership therein,

and to restrain the association from suspending or expelling
him for a violation of its illegal rules and by-laws: Greerv.
il
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Payne, (Court of Appeals of Kansas, No
46 Pac. Rep. I9o.

When a debt, including both principal and interest, and due
by instalments, would be free from usury, if paid according to
the terms of the contract, the transaction is not
rendered usurious by the voluntary payment of
the debt in full before some of the instalments matured,
although the result is that the creditor receives in the aggregate a sum amounting to more than the principal and the
maximum legal rate of interest: Savannah Say. Bk. v. Logan,
(Supreme Court of Georgia,) 25 S. E. Rep. 692.
The Supreme Court of Florida has lately reasserted the
well-settled principles (i) That the owner of land through
Waters,
Percolating,

which subsurface water, without any distinct,
definite and known channel, percolates or filters

Right
Thereto

through the soil to the land of an adjoining
owner, is not prohibited from digging into his own soil, and
appropriating water found there to any legitimate purposes of
his own, though, by so doing, the water may be entirely
diverted from the land to which it would otherwise have
naturally passed; but, if subterranean water has assumed the
proportions of a stream flowing in a well-defined channel, the
owner of the land though which it flows will not be authorized
to divert it, pollute it, or improperly use it, any more than if the
stream ran upon the surface in a well-defined course; and (2)
That the only difference in the application of the law to surface and subsurface streams is in ascertaining the character of
the stream ; and that if it does not appear that the percolating waters are supplied by a definite flowing stream, they will
be presumed to be formed by the ordinary percolation of
water in the soil, this presumption being-necessary on account
of the difficulty in determining whether the water flows in a
channel beneath the soil: Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 20
So. Rep. 780.

A bequest of money "for some one or more purposes, chari," is not void by reason of
table, philanthropic, or-
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Charitable
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the blank, but must be treated as one "for charitable or philanthropic purposes." Such a bequest,
however, is not a good charitable bequest, as there
may be philanthropic purposes which are not chari-

table. In re Macduff, (Chancery Division, Court of Appeal,)
[1896]

2

Ch. 451.

In In re Pea-sons' Estate, (Supreme Court of California,) 45
Pac. Rep. 849, a testator directed specified property to be sold
Bequest to on a certain event, and that "the proceeds of such
sale be equally distributed among the different
Charity,
Beneficiaries,

orphan asylums of the city and county of San
Francisco, and said asylums I request to be designated by the judge of the probate court." The
property was sold, and thirteen institutions claimed a share of
the fund realized. The court found that a part of this fund
could be distributed without danger to creditors, and accordingly distributed it among five only of the thirteen applicants,
rejecting the claims of the other eight. Four of these appealed.
On the appeal, it was held
(i) That the power of selection conferred on the probate
judge by the will was not arbitrary, but was to be controlled
by the powers conferred on the court by law; and that consequently all the institutions that could bring themselves
within the terms of the will were entitled to share in the fund;
(2) That a society, no matter what its name, whose articles
declared that "the objects and purposes of said society are to
render protection and assistance to sick and dependent women
and children," and which had a home in the city, where it
carried on the work of caring for and educating orphans,
half-orphans, and abandoned children, having therein an
average of twenty orphans, one hundred and fifteen halforphans, and' forty-two abandoned children, and from
one to three destitute women, was within the terms of the
bequest;
(3) That an orphan asylum whose home was without the
city, though it was managed by an organization from within
the city, received most of its inhabitants therefrom, and did
not confine its benefactions to the inhabitants of the city,
"Orphan
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or make any discrimination in their favor, was not within the
bequest;
(4) That a society whose charter empowered it to maintain
an orphan asylum, but which, in fact, supported a reformatory,
most of the inmates of its establishment being committed to it
under Pen. Code Cal., § 1388, others being sent to it by the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and one
being now and then brought to it by a mother who could not
support her child, oi who had a child who was in the habit of
running away, was not an "orphan asylum; " and,
(5) That institutions which did not maintain orphan asylums
until after the testator's death were not entitled to share in the
benefits of the bequest, though they had commenced to support such asylums before the fund arising from the bequest
was distributed.
Ardemus Stewart.

